Course Schedule

The precise course schedule will be announced before the seminar. Usually a day is structured as follows:

  • ¬†¬†¬† 9:00 AM to 12:30 PM: Lecture
  • ¬†¬†¬† 12:30 PM to 2:00 PM: Lunch
  • ¬†¬†¬† 2:00 PM to 5:00 PM: Lecture (or Exercises)
  • ¬†¬†¬† 8:00 PM: Dinner


Detailed Program

General pre-reading prior to the course

Levine, R. 2005. Finance and growth: theory and evidence. Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1A, Edited by Philippe Agion and Steven N. Durlauf. Elsevier, B.V.

Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny 1990. The stock market and investment: is the market a sideshow? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1990, No. 2: 157-215.

Bond, P., A. Edmans, and I. Goldstein 2012. The real effects of financial markets, Annual Review of Financial Economics 2012, Vol. 4: 339-360.

Verrecchia, R. 1982. Mathematical model in accounting, Journal of Accounting Research 20 (Supplement): 1-42.

Hirshleifer, J. 1971. The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive Activity, American Economic Review 61: 561-574.


Day 1: What information is in price and how does it get there?

Grossman, S. J., and J. E. Stiglitz 1980. On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets, American Economic Review 70: 393-408.

Diamond, D. 1985. Optimal release of information by firms, Journal of Finance, Vol. XL, No. 4, September.

Verrecchia, R. 1982. Information Acquisition in a Noisy Rational Expectations Economy, Econometrica 50, No. 6, 1415-1430.

Easley, D., and M. O’Hara 2004. Information and the cost of capital, Journal of Finance, August, 1553-1583.

Kyle, P. 1985. Continuous Auctions and Insider Trade, Econometrica 53: 1315-1335 (read the first two sections).

Dow, J., I. Goldstein, and A. Guembel 2015. Incentives for Information production in markets where prices affect real investment, Wharton School, working paper.

Gao, P., and P. J. Liang 2013. Informational Feedback, Adverse Selection, and Optimal Disclosure Policy, Journal of Accounting Research, 51(5), 1133-1158.


Day 2: When is more public information desirable?

Morris, S., and H. S. Shin 2002. Social Value of Public Information, American Economic Review 92: 1521-1534.

Allen, F., S. Morris, and H. S. Shin 2006. Beauty Contests and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets, Review of Financial Studies 19: 719-752.

Gao, P. Y. 2008. Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency, Journal of Accounting Research 46: 785-807.

Chen, Q., Z. Huang, and Y. Zhang 2014. The Effects of Public Information with Asymmetrically Informed Short-Horizon Investors, Journal of Accounting Research 52(3): 635-669.

Angeletos, G., and A. Pavan 2004. Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities, American Economic Review 94, No. 2 May, 91-98.

Chen, Q., T. Lewis, K. Schipper, and Y. Zhang 2015. Uniform vs. Discretionary Regimes in Reporting Information with Unverifiable Precision and a Coordination Role, Working paper, Duke University.


Day 3: Does accounting information and measurement matter and how?

Kanodia, C., and D. Lee 1998. Investment and Disclosure: The Disciplinary Role of Periodic Performance Reports, Journal of Accounting Research 36: 33-55.

Kanodia, C., A. Spero, and R. Singh 2005. Imprecision in Accounting Measurement: Can It Be Value Enhancing? Journal of Accounting Research 43: 487-519.

Feltham, G., and J. Ohlson 1996. Uncertainty resolution and the theory of depreciation measurement, Journal of Accounting Research 34: 209-234.

Chen, Q., K. Schipper, and N. Zhang 2015. Assessing Accounting Quality Using Assets and Earnings, Working paper, Duke University and Queen‚Äės University.

Kamenica, E., and M. Gentzkow 2011. Bayesian persuasion, American Economic Review 101: 2590-2615.

Huang, Z. 2015. Optimal Reporting System with Investor Information Acquisition, Working paper, Duke University.