We will have classes in the morning on July 9, 10 and 11. The afternoon of July 9 and July 10 is reserved for preparatory work for the next day’s classes. In addition, students will be given homework problems that will serve to test and deepen their understanding of that day’s material. These may be done in groups; moreover, a course assistant will be made available to assist the students when working on the homework assignments.

Day One and Two: Use of Subjective Information

  • Baker, G., R. Gibbons, and K. Murphy. 1994. Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (November): 1125-1156.
  • MacLeod, W. 2003. Optimal contracting with subjective evaluation. American Economic Review 93 (March): 216-240.
  • Rajan, M. V. and S. Reichelstein. 2006. Subjective performance indicators and discretionary bonus pools. Journal of Accounting Research 44 (June): 585-618.
  • Rajan, M. V. and S. Reichelstein. 2009. Objective versus subjective indicators of managerial performance. The Accounting Review 84 (January): 209-237.

Day Two and Three: Teams and Monitoring

  • Adams, C. 2006. Optimal team incentives with CES production. Economics Letters 92 (July): 143-148.
  • Feltham, G., and J. Xie. 1994. Performance measure congruity and diversity in multi-task principal/agent relations. The Accounting Review 69 (July): 429-453.
  • Holmstrom, B. 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13 (Autumn): 324-340.
  • Huddart, S., and P. Liang. 2003. Accounting in partnerships. American Economic Review 93 (May): 410-414.
  • Huddart, S., and P. Liang. 2005. Profit sharing and monitoring in partnerships. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40 (December): 153-187.
  • Liang, P., M. V. Rajan and K. Ray. 2008. Optimal team size and monitoring in organizations. The Accounting Review 83 (May): 789-822.
  • Rasmusen, E. 1987. Moral hazard in risk-averse teams. Rand Journal of Economics 18 (Autumn): 428-435.